Hidden Costs Of The Wireless Broadband Lifestyle: Comparing Consumer Protections In The United States, Canada, And The European Union by Dopplick, Renee
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology
Volume 15 | Issue 2 Article 3
2008
Hidden Costs Of The Wireless Broadband
Lifestyle: Comparing Consumer Protections In
The United States, Canada, And The European
Union
Renee Dopplick
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/jolt
Part of the Communications Law Commons, and the Internet Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Richmond Journal of Law
and Technology by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Renee Dopplick, Hidden Costs Of The Wireless Broadband Lifestyle: Comparing Consumer Protections In The United States, Canada, And
The European Union, 15 Rich. J.L. & Tech 5 (2008).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/jolt/vol15/iss2/3






HIDDEN COSTS OF THE WIRELESS BROADBAND LIFESTYLE: 
COMPARING CONSUMER PROTECTIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES, CANADA, AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
By:  Renee Dopplick∗ 
 
 
Cite as:  Renee Dopplick, Hidden Costs of the Wireless Broadband 
Lifestyle: Comparing Consumer Protections in the United States, Canada, 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1]  Spurred by relatively inexpensive and widely available retail 
equipment and increased residential Internet penetration, consumer 
demand for more wireless broadband options continues at a rapid rate.1  
Now, with consumers increasingly looking for mobile Internet 
interconnectivity over greater distances and with greater flexibility, 
technology companies are pushing the next generation of wireless 
broadband technologies with the promise of freeing consumers from 
location-based Internet access.2  These newer technologies can provide 
robust video and audio capabilities, such as digital television, on-demand 
video, and VoIP on a variety of digital devices.3  Yet, the rise of wireless 
                                                 
∗ Renee Dopplick earned her J.D. at the Georgetown University Law Center.  
1 Cf. CTIA, The Wireless Association: Wireless Quick Facts, 
http://www.ctia.org/advocacy/research/index.cfm/AID/10323 (last visited Nov. 20, 2008) 
(showing the increase in wireless penetration from 1995 to 2008).   
2 See LINDA K. MOORE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY AND 
SPECTRUM DEMAND: ADVANCED WIRELESS SERVICES 3 (2006); Wireless Innovation 
Alliance, http://www.wirelessinnovationalliance.com (last visited Nov. 20, 2008) 
(discussing a coalition of technology and public interest groups focused on expanding 
wireless broadband access). 
3 Id.  VoIP refers to Voice over Internet Protocol.  Id. at 3. 
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broadband networks and the roll-out of new technologies pose new public 
policy and regulatory challenges for spectrum management.4  If these 
issues are not addressed, rather than yielding ultimately beneficial private, 
public, and commercial uses of spectrum, the result could be detrimental 
frequency interference with negative impacts on equipment functionality, 
the integrity and reliability of networks, and the quality of service for 
spectrum-dependent commercial services.5 
 
[2]  To address some of these issues in the United States, the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) established the Wireless Broadband 
Access Task Force in 2004 to assess and recommend how to increase 
wireless broadband penetration in cost-effective and efficient ways.6  The 
Task Force concluded that universal wireless broadband access will 
depend on unlicensed mass-market consumer devices and greater 
spectrum access for such devices.7  The Task Force recommended that the 
FCC: (a) continue and expand spectrum access by unlicensed devices; (b) 
consider increased power limits by unlicensed devices to permit greater 
range from Internet access points; (c) promote voluntary industry 
cooperation to mitigate potential interference among consumer devices; 
and (d) work closely with industry to address intentional regulatory 
violations that cause detrimental interference.8  Most consumers and 
technology groups support the Task Force’s recommendations because 
increased spectrum access could foster market competition and thus 
                                                 
4 See Memorandum on the Spectrum Policy for the 21st Century, 1 PUB. PAPERS 605 
(May 29, 2003) (“The existing legal and policy framework for spectrum management has 
not kept pace with the dramatic changes in technology and spectrum use.”). 
5 Cf. Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Remarks at the Silicon 
Flatirons Telecommunications Program at the University of Colorado at Boulder: 
Broadband Migration III: New Directions in Wireless Policy (Oct. 30, 2002), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/2002/spmkp212.html (discussing changes in the 
role of interference in spectrum policy). 
6 See Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Chairman Michael K. Powell 
Announces Formation of Wireless Broadband Access Task Force (May 5, 2004); Press 
Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Wireless Broadband Access Task Force Seeks Public 
Comment on Issues Related to Commission’s Wireless Broadband Policies (May 5, 
2004). 
7 See WIRELESS BROADBAND ACCESS TASK FORCE, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, 
CONNECTED & ON THE GO: BROADBAND GOES WIRELESS 5-8 (2005) (calling for 
“innovative” regulatory approaches). 
8 Id. at 5-6. 
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promote innovative, low-cost, and high-speed wireless communications 
and consumer equipment options.9 
 
[3]  In action consistent with the Task Force’s recommendation to increase 
spectrum access for wireless broadband devices, the FCC voted 
unanimously on November 4, 2008 to allow “new, sophisticated” 
unlicensed devices to operate on a shared, secondary basis in unused 
broadcasting spectrum.10  The unused spectrum, commonly referred to as 
“white spaces,” will become available upon the transition to digital 
television scheduled to occur on February 17, 2009.11  The ruling allows 
for fixed and mobile wireless broadband devices for consumers and 
businesses.12  To address the concerns of commercial operators that such 
shared-spectrum devices may cause interference with licensed services,13 
the ruling imposes stricter regulatory approval requirements for shared-
spectrum devices.14  All devices must have geolocation ability, spectrum-
                                                 
9 See Comments of  The New America Foundation Consumers Union et al. at 2, 25-26, 
In re Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands, Additional Spectrum for 
Unlicensed Devices Below 900 MHz and in the 3 GHz Band, ET Docket Nos. 04-186, 
02-380 (Apr. 17, 2003) (endorsing the allocation of more unlicensed spectrum and 
sharing in licensed spectrum). 
10 In re Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands, Additional Spectrum for 
Unlicensed Devices Below 900 MHz and in the 3 GHz Band, ET Docket Nos. 04-186, 
02-380, (Nov. 14, 2008), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-260A1.pdf; see also Press 
Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Adopts Rules for Unlicensed Use of Television 
White Spaces (Nov. 4, 2008), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-286566A1.pdf (announcing the 
unanimous adoption of the Second Report and Order FCC 08-260) 
11 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996), 
amended by Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006) (to 
be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309) (implementing FCC rules to require digital terrestrial 
broadcasts by February 17, 2009).     
12 See Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, supra note 10. 
13 Leaders of News Corp., Disney, CBS, and NBC Universal wrote to the FCC Chairman 
in 2007 to recommend that unlicensed mobile devices should not be allowed in the digital 
television band due to their potential to cause harmful interference, including possible 
“permanent damage” to licensed services.  See, e.g., John Eggerton, Network Chiefs 
Oppose Mobile Unlicensed Devices: Big Four Heads Write FCC Chairman Martin, 
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 10, 2007, available at 
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA6488840.html?industryid=47171&q=Netw
ork+Chiefs+Oppose.  
14 See Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, supra note 10. 
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sensing technology to find available spectrum, and Internet access to a 
centralized database of incumbent licensees to determine which spectrum 
may be used by the unlicensed device at that location.15  The FCC will test 
and certify devices in the laboratory.16  For devices relying solely on 
spectrum-sensing technologies, the FCC will test the devices in both the 
laboratory and real-world settings.17  If an approved device causes harmful 
interference once on the market, the FCC asserts that it will act promptly 
to remove such equipment from the market and will require the 
responsible parties to remedy any interference.18  
 
[4]  Because legal enforcement to halt interference relies on individual 
consumers ceasing to operate the devices, commercial operators worry 
that after-the-fact enforcement to protect licensed services from 
interference could prove time-consuming and inadequate, particularly if 
the offending technology is on portable devices or becomes widespread in 
the marketplace.19  Although the ruling asserts a right of FCC enforcement 
action in the event of harmful interference, it does not guarantee 
compensation to licensees or consumers of licensed services for outages or 
degraded signal reception caused by offending unlicensed devices.  The 
ruling is also silent on consumer remedies, such as the right to 
compensation, product return, or product exchange, should the unlicensed 
                                                 
15 See id.  
16 See id. 
17 See id.  
18 See id.  
19 See Joint Comments in Support of “Emergency Request” at 5, In re Unlicensed 
Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands, Additional Spectrum for Unlicensed Devices 
Below 900 MHz and in the 3 GHz Band, ET Docket Nos. 04-186, 02-380 (Oct. 24, 
2008), available at 
http://www.nab.org/xert/corpcomm/pressrel/releases/102408_StateBroadcasters_WhiteSp
aces.pdf (“The Congress, the FCC, and very likely state and local law enforcement, will 
be inundated with potentially millions of complaints from members of the public looking 
for the causes of interference to their television sets.”); Reply Comments of MSTV and 
NAB to OET Measurement Report on DTV Receiver Interference Rejection Capabilities 
at 4, In re Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands, Additional Spectrum for 
Unlicensed Devices Below 900 MHz and in the 3 GHz Band, ET Docket Nos. 04-186, 
02-380 (May 15, 2007), available at 
http://www.nab.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Filings1&CONTENTID=8338&TEMPL
ATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm (arguing that interference from portable devices that can 
be operated in and relocated to any geographical area will be difficult, if not nearly 
impossible, to identify and to resolve the interference). 
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devices cause harmful interference that renders them unlawful to operate. 
[5]  This article explores the impact on U.S. consumers when wireless 
broadband devices interfere with or suffer interference from licensed and 
unlicensed devices.  This interference causes degraded device 
performance and makes devices unlawful to operate according to the FCC 
regulations.  First, the article briefly discusses the regulation of wireless 
consumer devices in the United States.  Specifically, the article addresses 
consumer notification requirements regarding rights of use and states that 
consumers have a duty to eliminate harmful interference.  The article also 
describes consumer rights and possible remedies when interference 
renders equipment unusable or unlawful to operate.   
 
[6]  Next, the article compares the U.S. approach with the regulatory 
approaches of Canada and the European Union, which rely on similar 
technical interference standards.  The article then discusses how 
interference from multiple wireless technologies and black-market devices 
can impact consumer protections.  The article explores the advantages and 
limitations of possible market, regulatory, and legislative mechanisms 
designed to enhance consumer protection.  The article asserts that 
consumers will benefit from a continued light regulatory approach for 
unlicensed wireless devices.  Yet, emergent wireless broadband 
technologies for consumer devices are challenging traditional notions of 
spectrum management and how and when consumers may use unlicensed 
devices.  Thus, the article recommends greater consumer advocacy in the 
regulatory process to ensure adequate consideration of consumer rights, 
duties, and remedies when a wireless broadband device creates or suffers 
from interference. 
 
II.  REGULATION OF WIRELESS CONSUMER DEVICES IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
 
[7]  Unlicensed wireless consumer devices sold in the United States are 
permitted under 47 C.F.R. § 15, subject to the rules and minimum 
technical performance specifications issued by the FCC.20  Consumers 
                                                 
20 See 47 C.F.R. § 15.1 (2008); cf. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L TELECOMMS. & 
INFO. ADMIN., MANUAL OF REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES FOR FEDERAL RADIO 
FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT annex K (2008) (applying similar regulations and standards 
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have been able to use unlicensed devices since 1934 due to a government 
spectrum policy to “generally encourage the larger and more effective use 
of radio in the public interest” through flexible regulation of standards-
based devices.21  Assigned licenses can limit marketplace innovation, 
competition, and efficient spectrum usage by creating barriers to entry and 
conferring legal rights to a limited number of market actors.22  Because of 
these limiting possibilities, the FCC has pursued a parallel public-interest 
policy to allow non-exclusive and secondary spectrum access for 
unlicensed devices, provided that these devices operate within permissible 
frequencies and power rates.  The FCC also prohibits such devices from 
causing harmful interference to licensed services and devices.23  This 
unlicensed regulatory approach supports shared usage and increases 
spectrum access for multiple market actors.  This approach, however, does 
not recognize consumer rights to legal protections against interference 
while operating unlicensed devices. 
 
[8]  In light of public policy goals that promote marketplace flexibility and 
due to the absence of legal mechanisms to protect consumers from 
unwanted interference, this section examines four aspects of the regulatory 
principles and duties of the consumer under 47 C.F.R. § 15: (a) the 
regulatory approach of devices for use in the residential environment; (b) 
labeling and consumer notification requirements; (c) the consumer’s duty 
to eliminate harmful interference; and (d) the remedies available to 
consumers when equipment becomes unusable or unlawful to operate. 
 
A.  REGULATION OF UNLICENSED WIRELESS DEVICES IN RESIDENTIAL 
ENVIRONMENTS 
 
[9]  License-exempt devices, referred to as unlicensed devices throughout, 
are regulated under 47 C.F.R. § 15, which sets forth relevant 
administrative, technical, and marketing rules.24  Nearly all consumer, 
                                                                                                                         
as Part 15 when the federal government devices interfere with federal uses of the 
spectrum). 
21 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (2000). 
22 See Harold Feld, From Third Class Citizen to First Among Equals: Rethinking the 
Place of Unlicensed Spectrum in the FCC Hierarchy, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 53, 
85-86 (2006). 
23 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 15.5(b); see also id. §§ 15.205, 15.209. 
24 See id. § 15.1(a) (describing the scope of FCC regulations). 
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retail wireless devices in the United States are regulated under 47 C.F.R. § 
15 and thus do not require licensing.25  But in order to market or sell 
unlicensed wireless devices in the United States, manufacturers must show 
that devices comply with minimal performance standards established 
under 47 C.F.R. § 15.26  Unlicensed equipment includes intentional, 
unintentional, and incidental radio-frequency radiators.27  Many wireless 
broadband technologies are designed to emit radio frequency energy; 
therefore, “unlicensed devices” will be used throughout this article to refer 
primarily to intentional radiators.28 
 
[10]  The FCC regulations located at 47 C.F.R. § 15 prioritize the 
management of interference.  The regulations achieve this objective by 
dividing equipment into two major categories with different interference 
standards: non-residential Class A and residential Class B equipment.29  
Unlicensed devices designed for use in residential environments30 must 
comply with interference standards under the FCC regulations.31  This 
policy decision reflects two presumptions.  First, residential devices likely 
will be located closer together, which increases the risk of interference.  
Second, manufacturers of low-cost, mass-market consumer devices lack 
sufficient competitive incentives to include interference abatement beyond 
the minimum regulatory limits.32  Accordingly, 47 C.F.R. § 15 defines 
permissible frequency bands, restricts device power limits, and specifies 
minimum operating performance standards.33  Manufacturers are 
responsible for complying with 47 C.F.R. § 15 verification or certification 
                                                 
25 See id. § 15.1; id. § 15.3 (defining the devices regulated under Part 15). 
26 See id. § 15.1(c) (requiring manufacturers of devices to comply with the administrative 
and technical provisions of 47 C.F.R. § 15 before marketing the devices).  
27 See id. § 15.1(a). 
28 See id. § 15.3(n)-(o), (z). 
29 See id. § 15.3(h)-(i). 
30 See id. § 15.3(i). 
31 See id. § 15.209. 
32 See, e.g., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, In re 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review – 
Conducted Emissions Limits Below 30 MHz for Equipment Regulated Under Parts 15 
and 18 of the Commission’s Rules, ET Docket No. 98-80 (Oct. 13, 1999), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Engineering_Technology/Notices/1999/fcc99296.txt 
(supporting continued regulation of unlicensed devices through a standards-based 
approach). 
33 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 15.202, 15.247; see also id. § 15.247 (discussing performance rules 
relevant to wireless local area networks). 
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requirements (depending on the type of device as specified in the 
regulations) before marketing the equipment to consumers.34  This light 
regulatory approach to the use of spectrum and devices aims to minimize 
regulatory bureaucracy, thereby creating incentives for technological 
innovation and encouraging market actors to negotiate efficient uses of 
shared spectrum.35 
 
B.  MANDATORY LABELING AND CONSUMER NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS 
 
[11]  For residential consumer devices, the FCC regulations impose four 
major mandatory labeling and notification requirements on 
manufacturers.36  For most devices, the FCC's first requirement instructs 
manufacturers to place a label on the device in a “conspicuous location,” 
indicating that it complies with 47 C.F.R. § 15.37  The label may be either 
a textual statement—“This device complies with Part 15 of the FCC 
Rules”38—or, if the device is too small, an FCC-defined graphical 
identifier.39  Manufacturers are required to provide compliance 
information on the external product packaging only when the required 
textual statement is not provided on the device or in the owner’s manual.40  
Thus, the requirements permit manufacturers to provide compliance 
information to the consumer inside the product packaging and after the 
point of sale.  
 
[12]  Second, manufacturers must notify consumers in writing of their 
limited rights when operating an unlicensed device.41  The required 
                                                 
34 See id. § 15.1. 
35 See Kathleen Q. Abernathy, My View from the Doorstep of FCC Change, 54 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 199, 205 (2002) (highlighting market-based advantages and consumer 
benefits under the FCC’s regulatory approach to 47 C.F.R. § 15). 
36 See 47 C.F.R. § 15.19. 
37 Id. § 15.19(a)(1). See also id. § 15.19(b)(1).  
38 Id. § 15.19(a)(3). Compare id., with id. § 15.19(b)(1)-(4) (requiring a permanent label, 
text, and the graphical identifier devices subject to Declaration of Conformity approval 
but allowing some text to be placed in the owner's manual if the device is too small).  
39 Id. § 15.19(a)(5). 
40 The labeling information must be placed on the product, or, if that is impracticable, in 
the instruction manual or on the device’s container. See id.  Compliance labels must be 
“readily visible” to the consumer at the time of purchase for devices subject to 
Declaration of Conformity approval by the FCC. See id. § 15.19 (b)(1)-(4). 
41 See id. § 15.19(a)(3), (a)(5). 
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statement must affirm that the  device complies with 47 C.F.R. § 15 and 
that operation is subject to two conditions: “(1) This device may not cause 
harmful interference, and (2) this device must accept any interference 
received, including interference that may cause undesired operation.”42  
Logistically, this notification must be provided in one of three ways: (1) 
on the device; (2) in a “prominent location in the instruction manual” 
supplied to the consumer; or (3) “on the container in which the device is 
marketed.”43  Accordingly, manufacturers may provide pre-sale 
notification on the external product packaging,44 but, in practice, they 
generally provide post-sale notification inside the packaging, typically in 
the owner’s manual.45  The regulations allow the owner’s manual to be 
included as a printed booklet, on a digital media disk, or on a 
manufacturer’s website.46  In 2004, the FCC explained that online access 
to manuals “will provide increased flexibility to manufacturers, result in 
cost savings to the industry and could enhance access to the disabled 
community because computers could ‘read’ information to the user or 
magnify it for easier viewing.”47  
 
[13]  Third, consumers must be informed in the owner’s manual that any 
modification to the unlicensed device voids regulatory compliance and 
may preclude lawful use.48  The regulations do not require this notification 
to appear on the label.49  In practice, the caution against device 
modification by the consumer generally appears on the same page or in the 
same section in the owner’s manual as the regulatory compliance 
statement and statements regarding the prohibition of harmful interference 
                                                 
42 Id. § 15.19(a)(3); cf. id. § 15.19(a)(1) (requiring that “receivers associated with the 
operation of a licensed radio service” provide notice to consumers that the operation 
“does not cause harmful interference”).  
43 Id. § 15.19(a)(3), (a)(5). 
44 See id. § 15.19(a)(5). 
45 See, e.g., Wii Operations Manual, available at 
http://www.nintendo.com/consumer/downloads/WiiOpMn_setup.pdf. 
46 47 C.F.R. § 15.21 (allowing manufacturers to provide information to the user through 
“computer disk or over the Internet”). 
47 Review of Part 15 and Other Parts of the Commission’s Rules, 19 F.C.C.R. 22311, 
22312 (2004).  
48 See 47 C.F.R. § 15.21. 
49 See id.; see also id. § 15.19(a)(5) (enumerating specific requirements for consumer 
notification). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XV, Issue 2 
 
 10
and risks of interference.50  Fourth, manufacturers must inform consumers 
of the recommended steps to take to correct interference.51  This 
requirement is discussed below, within the description of self-correction as 
a potential remedy for consumers.52  Thus, 47 C.F.R. § 15 requires 
manufacturers to provide compliance information on the device when 
possible and additional information in the owner’s manual, including a 
warning of potential interference with other devices, a statement to warn 
against unauthorized modifications, and a list of recommended steps to 
correct interference. 
 
C.  DUTY OF CONSUMER TO ELIMINATE HARMFUL INTERFERENCE 
AND TO ACCEPT ANY INTERFERENCE 
 
[14]  Pursuant to required labeling language, consumers may operate an 
unlicensed wireless broadband device as long as it “accept[s] any 
interference received, including interference that may cause undesired 
operation” and does not cause “harmful interference.”53  These critical 
device limitations are sufficient to warrant special regulatory attention to 
facilitate consumer awareness, as reflected in the requirement that 
manufacturers must include this notice on the device when possible or in 
the owner’s manual.54  Notably, the standard does not impose an absolute 
prohibition on causing interference; rather, it prohibits “harmful 
interference.”55  While manufacturers are not required to provide 
clarification to consumers, the FCC regulations define “harmful 
interference” as “[a]ny emission, radiation or induction that endangers the 
functioning of a radio navigation service or of other safety services or 
seriously degrades, obstructs or repeatedly interrupts a 
                                                 
50 See, e.g., iGo Stowaway Bluetooth Keyboard Owner’s Manual, available at 
http://corporate.igo.com/support/Download%20Support/PPC/En/om/Stowaway%20Bluet
ooth%20for%20PPC%20Owner%20Manual_US.pdf; Yamaha mLan Expansion Board 
Owner’s Manual, available at 
http://www2.yamaha.co.jp/manual/pdf/emi/english/synth/mLAN16E2_en_om_a0.pdf. 
51 47 C.F.R. § 15.105(b). 
52 See infra Part II.D.  
53 47 C.F.R. § 15.19(a)(3). 
54 See id. § 15.19(a)(5).  
55 See id. § 15.19(3); see also R. Paul Margie, Can You Hear Me Now? Getting Better 
Reception from the FCC’s Spectrum Policy, 2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, ¶ 25 (2004) 
(emphasis added). 
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radiocommunications service operating in accordance with this chapter.”56  
The FCC regulations do not define what constitutes “degrades,” 
“obstructs,” or “repeatedly interferes.”57  Further, no court has addressed 
whether the definition is overly vague.58  Thus, consumers face both 
incomplete information and a vague legal standard when determining 
whether a device is causing harmful interference.  Further, consumers 
must accept any interference, including harmful interference, as a 
condition of operating devices.59  Interference could cause degradation of 
performance, connectivity, or range of the wireless broadband 
equipment.60 
 
[15]  Two duties of the consumer when operating an unlicensed device—
to avoid causing harmful interference and to accept any interference—are 
augmented by two additional constraints given in the regulations but not 
mandated in the labeling and consumer notification requirements.  First, 
under the general requirements for operation, the consumer does not 
receive or possess a “vested or recognizable right to continued use of any 
given frequency” on the basis of device certification or use.61  Being the 
owner of the device does not guarantee the consumer exclusive, 
continuous, or ongoing usage of that wireless device at a specific 
frequency.62  Although a consumer may operate an unlicensed wireless 
device for weeks, months, or years, this operation does not confer a first-
in-time “vested” right to continue to operate the device if another licensed 
or unlicensed device begins to operate at that frequency.63  Applying a 
property rights framework to the spectrum, the FCC essentially grants the 
consumer permissive usage rights but does not allow the consumer to 
claim a per se right to spectrum possession or access simply because the 
unlicensed wireless device complies with 47 C.F.R. § 15.64  This lack of 
                                                 
56 47 C.F.R. § 15.3(m). 
57 See Margie, supra note 55, at ¶ 27. 
58 See id. ¶ 28 (stating that the FCC and courts have not expanded on the “harmful 
interference” standard). 
59 See 47 C.F.R. § 15.19(a)(3). 
60 See Margie, supra note 55, ¶ 1. 
61 47 C.F.R. § 15.5(a).  
62 See id.  
63 See id. § 15.5(a)-(c). 
64 Cf. Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did 
FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & Econ. 529, 532 n.8 (1998) (reviewing 
spectrum rights in the context of a radio spectrum). 
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affirmative spectrum rights assures that licensees are protected from 
harmful interference and permits shared spectrum access by allowing 
multiple unlicensed devices within a specific frequency band. 
 
[16]  The second requirement of 47 C.F.R. § 15 relevant to consumers, but 
not mandated by the labeling or notification requirements, is related to 
enforcement authority.  Specifically, the regulations clarify who is 
authorized to require consumers to cease device operations and under what 
circumstances they may exercise such authority.65  For most consumer 
devices, the current mandatory labeling and notification requirements 
neither explicitly instruct the consumer to cease operation if the device 
causes harmful interference, nor identify the appropriate authority to 
enforce the duty of non-harmful interference.66  The information merely 
warns the consumer that operation of the device is “subject to” a 
restriction against harmful interference; thus, the duty to cease operations 
in the event of harmful interference is only implicit.67  Further, there is no 
required language to inform the consumer what constitutes sufficient 
notice of harmful interference.68  As a result, a consumer may be uncertain 
whether notification by a neighbor or other non-FCC entity constitutes 
sufficient notification to require the consumer to cease operation when 
such a party asserts that the consumer’s device is causing harmful 
interference.   
 
[17]  The regulations, however, clearly indicate that the appropriate 
authority is the FCC: “[t]he operator of a radio frequency device shall be 
required to cease operating the device upon notification by a Commission 
representative that the device is causing harmful interference. Operation 
shall not resume until the condition causing the harmful interference has 
been corrected.”69  The operator of an interfering device is not required to 
stop using the device until notified by the FCC; thus, enforcement issues 
are raised when other parties provide notice of interference.70  
 
[18]  Thus, consumers have a legal duty to cease operation of an 
                                                 
65 See 47 C.F.R. § 15.5(c). 
66 See id. §§ 15.5(c), 15.19(a)(3). 
67 See id. § 15.19(a)(3). 
68 See id. 
69 Id. § 15.5(c). 
70 See id.  
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unlicensed wireless device when it causes harmful interference to licensed 
devices and services or as otherwise specified by the FCC.71  In addition, 
unlicensed devices must accept interference from other licensed and 
unlicensed devices, even if the device becomes inoperable.72  Although a 
manufacturer may certify and sell a device as compliant with 47 C.F.R. § 
15, the consumer ultimately bears the burden of eliminating harmful 
interference or resolving any interference that impairs the proper 
functioning of the device.73  Accordingly, even if an unlicensed device 
meets technical compliance standards, the regulations require interference 
correction on an individual consumer basis.74  
 
D.  CONSUMER REMEDIES WHEN UNLICENSED WIRELESS DEVICES 
CAUSE INTERFERENCE 
 
[19]  Should a consumer’s unlicensed wireless device create harmful 
interference, the consumer faces five options: (1) self-correction, (2) 
product return, (3) warranty, (4) after-market resale or recycling, and (5) 
consumer complaint to the FCC.  The first option, mentioned explicitly in 
the owner’s manual for a wireless broadband device, encourages the 
consumer to attempt to correct the interference by: a) reorienting the 
device or its receiving antenna; b) increasing the distance between the 
interfering device and other devices; c) connecting the equipment into a 
different circuit than that used by the receiver; or d) consulting the dealer 
or an experienced technician for further assistance.75  These FCC 
recommendations aim to reduce harmful interference so that unlicensed 
devices comply with the regulations and are permissible to operate.76  
Self-correction of interference, however, merely provides conventional 
procedures for prescriptive relief rather than an external remedy.77  If the 
device causes harmful interference and the consumer is unable to mitigate 
the interference, the consumer must stop using the device.78   
                                                 
71 See id.  
72 Id. § 15.5(b). 
73 See id. § 15.5(c). 
74 See id.  
75 See id. § 15.105(b) (providing explicit text for inclusion in device owner’s manuals 
related to how consumers may abate or attempt to correct interference).  
76 See id.  
77 See id.  
78 See id. § 15.5(c). 
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[20]  The second option is to return the device to the place of purchase for 
a refund or replacement.  This option may be less desirable because it 
requires that consumer product returns adhere to state law, retailer terms, 
specified timeframes for return, and possible restocking fees.79  This 
remedy is of limited value to a consumer who discovers harmful 
interference after the window of product return has passed and is unable to 
resolve interference by following the FCC recommendations.  
 
[21]  The third option assumes that an express or implied product warranty 
may protect the consumer.  This option, however, is unlikely to cover 
product return or replacement where there is no material or workmanship 
defect that renders the device noncompliant with 47 C.F.R. § 15.80  
Consider a consumer’s device that is causing interference and is no longer 
lawful to operate under the regulations.  So long as the interfering device 
meets minimal technical performance standards and is certified by the 
FCC for sale and use in the marketplace, it is unlikely that the FCC will 
require the dealer or manufacturer to provide a remedy to the consumer.  
Rather, the duty is on the consumer, as the operator of the device, to 
correct and resolve any interference problems.81 
 
[22]  The FCC regulations foresee potential interference risks, explicitly 
warn the consumer that operation of the device is subject to interference 
constraints, and ultimately shift the financial burden of device operation 
from manufacturers to consumers.82  Therefore, in the absence of an FCC-
mandated remedy for product recalls, the manufacturer has no duty and 
little incentive to provide consumers with a refund for a compliant device 
that receives or causes harmful interference on an isolated basis.83  For a 
warranty claim, the consumer would need to demonstrate that the product 
                                                 
79 See, e.g., Apple Sales and Refunds Policy, available at 
http://store.apple.com/Catalog/US/Images/salespoliciesEdIndividual.html.  
80 See U.C.C. § 2-719 (1998) (remedies are available to the buyer for non-conforming 
goods). 
81 See 47 C.F.R. § 15.5(c).   
82 See id. § 15.19(a)(3); see also id. § 15.5(c) (warning that an operator must cease 
operating a device that causes harmful interference). 
83 See James T. O’Reilly, Product Recalls & the Third Restatement: Consumers Lose 
Twice from Defects in Products and in the Restatement Itself, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 883, 
884, 888-91 (2003) (discussing the processes and incentives for product recalls, including 
the lack of incentives for manufacturers to compensate consumers in the absence of 
government-mandated recalls).  
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violates the technical performance standards of device certification and is 
consequently no longer compliant with 47 C.F.R. § 15.84  This policy 
reflects the expectation that consumers are in the appropriate position to 
absorb the marketplace costs arising from occasional interference through 
additional purchases of non-interfering wireless devices.  This expectation 
is based on the following assumptions: 1) the FCC’s light regulatory 
approach benefits consumers by lowering overall costs for unlicensed 
wireless devices; and 2) better replacement technologies will gradually 
provide broader interference correction in the marketplace, fuel 
competition, encourage innovation, and generate more product options. 
 
[23]  Pursuant to the fourth option, after-market resale, the consumer may 
sell the device with the hope of recouping costs.85  The presumption is that 
another consumer would be subject to different environmental factors, 
such as a further distance from incompatible devices, which would allow 
the device to operate legally and correctly.  This option may provide only 
partial financial compensation.  Further, resale shifts the risks to another 
consumer rather than to other market actors who may be better able to 
absorb the costs.86  These actors could include manufacturers, retailers, 
and technology companies that provide wireless broadband services 
through unlicensed devices.  
 
[24]  Consumers’ fifth option is to file a complaint with the FCC, seeking 
investigation and enforcement action against the party operating the 
interfering device.  Because the owner of an unlicensed device must 
accept the risks of any interference, the owner will not likely be successful 
unless the interfering device is an unlawful black-market device. 
Consumers can also file complaints with the FCC against manufacturers or 
retailers, but consumers will likely receive little to no redress.87  
                                                 
84 See, e.g., Motorola, Software License, Warranty, Safety, and Regulatory Information 
Broadband Home Networking Products, available at 
http://broadband.motorola.com/consumers/products/BR700/downloads/BR700_Warranty
.pdf.  
85 See, e.g., eBay: Sell, http://sell.ebay.com/sell (last visited Nov. 19, 2008). 
86 See, e.g., BLUETOOTH MUSIC GATEWAY USER GUIDE 12, available at 
http://www.kyocerawireless.com/support/pdf/wireless-music-gateway-user-guide.pdf. 
87 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: FCC HAS MADE SOME 
PROGRESS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF ITS ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM BUT FACES 
LIMITATIONS, AND ADDITIONAL ACTIONS ARE NEEDED 1 (2008), available at 
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According to a U.S. Government Accountability Office Report on FCC 
enforcement measures released in February 2008, the FCC does a poor job 
of resolving consumer complaints and rarely pursues enforcement 
actions.88  FCC Field Office officials in the Spectrum Enforcement 
Division, which has oversight of unlicensed consumer wireless devices, 
assert that the majority of investigations do not lead to enforcement action 
because FCC rules were not violated.89  Yet, when tracking consumer 
complaints, the FCC’s internal database frequently omits the outcome or 
the reason why the complaint was closed.90   
 
[25]  As of 2004, FCC enforcement letters no longer recommend that 
consumers contact manufacturers to request their voluntary cooperation 
when seeking relief.91  The current letters include a reminder to the 
consumer that they must uphold their duty to correct harmful 
interference.92  The 2004 revisions also added a warning to the consumer 
that failure to correct the problem or cease using the device may result in 
an FCC violation and fine.93  
 
[26]  Thus, contractual, marketplace, and regulatory enforcement remedies 
                                                                                                                         
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08125.pdf [hereinafter U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE REPORT]. 
88 See id. at 7, 21.   
89 See id. at 34. 
90 Id. 
91 Compare, e.g., FCC Enforcement Letters (Dec. 27, 2004), 
http://www.arrl.org/tis/info/HTML/ plc/FCC_enforcement/part-15/alarm-12-24-04.html 
(omitting any reference to manufacturers and consistent with other letters since 2004), 
with Letter from Sharon Bowers, Deputy Chief, Consumer & Governmental Affairs 
Bureau, to Keith F. Higginbotham (June 2, 2003), 
http://www.arrl.org/tis/info/HTML/plc/FCC_enforcement/part-15/cordless-
speakerphone-03-06-02.html (“Manufacturers will often bear some of this responsibility 
as a courtesy to their customers. We encourage the parties and manufacturers involved 
to voluntarily resolve this matter without FCC intervention.”). 
92 See FCC Enforcement Letters (Dec. 27, 2004), 
http://www.arrl.org/tis/info/HTML/plc/FCC_enforcement/part-15/alarm-12-24-04.html. 
93 See, e.g., FCC Enforcement Letters (Jan. 30, 2007), 
http://www.arrl.org/tis/info/HTML/plc/ FCC_enforcement/part-15/unknown-device-07-
01-30.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2008) (“While the FCC has confidence that most people 
are able to resolve these issues voluntarily, the FCC wants to make you aware that this 
unresolved problem may be a violation of FCC rules and could result in a monetary 
forfeiture (fine) for each occurrence.”). 
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may provide protections for consumers when a device becomes 
inoperable.  Although pragmatic, the protections are largely limited.  The 
remedies reflect public policy choices as to who should bear the risks and 
costs of technological innovation.  To date, the public policy strategy 
prioritizes interference prevention through device certification, regulatory 
oversight, and the channeling of financial risks to the consumer.94  The 
strategy has proven successful thus far because innovative consumer 
electronics at bargain basement prices make it reasonably inexpensive for 
consumers to replace interfering devices with newer technologies.  New 
technologies, however, may challenge this cost-based presumption. The 
increasingly sophisticated and complex components of emergent 
technologies and the convergence of technologies may result in higher-
priced devices.  Part IV of this article discusses the channeling of financial 
risks to consumers in greater detail and analyzes its relation to emergent 
technologies and the proliferation of black-market devices.  Part V 
discusses whether to modify underlying public policy and regulatory 
approaches that channel financial risks to consumers.  
 
III.  REGULATION OF WIRELESS CONSUMER DEVICE REGULATION IN 
CANADA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
[27]  This section compares the U.S. approach to consumers’ rights and 
responsibilities when operating wireless broadband devices with the 
regulatory approaches of Canada and the European Union.  A comparison 
of the U.S. approach with these jurisdictions is beneficial because each has 
adopted, with some modifications, international standards under the 
auspices of the International Electrotechnical Commission95 that are 
similar to the domestic standards imposed by 47 C.F.R. § 15.96  The EU 
                                                 
94 See MANASI DESHPANDE & DOUGLAS W. ELMENDORF, AN ECONOMIC STRATEGY FOR 
INVESTING IN AMERICA’S INFRASTRUCTURE 31-32 (2008), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/07_infrastructure_elmendorf/07
_infrastructurestrat_elmendorf.pdf (encouraging more flexibility in the FCC’s policy of 
interference prevention). 
95 See International Electrotechnical Commission: Members of the IEC, 
http://www.iec.ch/dyn/www/f?p=102:5:0::::FSP_LANG_ID:25 
96 See, e.g., Manual for Dell Wireless LAN Adapter: Model TM1100PC, available at 
http://support.euro.dell.com/support/edocs/network/079nk/declare.htm (featuring similar 
compliance statements that reference the limitation or prevention of interference: 47 
C.F.R. § 15 for the United States; Radio Standards Specifications RSS-210 for Canada; 
and the European Telecommunications Standard ETS 300.328).  
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and Canadian regulatory approaches and consumer protections differ from 
those in the United States in several specific ways.  The EU and Canadian 
approaches purport different definitions for what constitutes a 
“residential” environment.  They also permit different amounts and types 
of marketing of non-residential equipment to residential consumers, 
labeling and consumer notification requirements, and threshold standards 
for interference.  All three jurisdictions, however, lack legal protections 
for consumers whose devices become inoperable or unlawful due to 
harmful interference after the permissible time period to return a product 
for a refund has passed. 
 
A.  MARKETING INDUSTRIAL DEVICES TO CONSUMERS FOR USE IN 
RESIDENTIAL ENVIRONMENTS 
 
[28]  Device regulations vary slightly across jurisdictions based on 
whether the consumer intends to use the device in a residential or 
industrial location, what constitutes a “residential” environment, and when 
companies may market certain technologies to consumers.  The regulation 
of devices for residential environments has become increasingly important 
and complicated as lower equipment costs make commercial-grade 
wireless technologies more attractive to home consumers, neighborhood 
groups, and municipalities, and as mobile wireless devices allow 
consumers high-speed broadband access from locations outside the 
home.97  The U.S. regulatory approach focuses on managing interference 
and divides permissible marketing activities into two categories: consumer 
devices and all other devices (based on the presumption of use in 
residential or non-residential locations).98  This approach prohibits 
manufacturers from marketing industrial-grade devices to U.S. consumers 
but does not preclude commercial clients from purchasing or using 
consumer-grade devices.99 
 
[29]  The European Union similarly distinguishes between consumer and 
                                                 
97 See, e.g., Vivato  Indoor & Outdoor Wi-Fi Base Stations,  available at 
http://www.vivato.net/downloads/VP12001210%20Datasheet.pdf (advertising an 
unlicensed Class B wireless modem for use indoors or mounted on the building's exterior 
for connectivity outdoors). 
98 See 47 C.F.R. § 15.3(h)-(i) (2008). 
99 See id. § 2.803; see also id. §§ 15.101(a), 15.107, 15.109 (listing the devices and their 
authorization, frequency, and radiation emission requirements). 
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industrial devices for regulatory purposes but imposes no marketing 
prohibitions.100  For example, the European Union neither requires 
demonstration of device compliance before marketing to consumers nor 
precludes the marketing of industrial devices for residential purposes.101  
Rather, the consumer is warned that the device may cause radio 
interference in a residential environment, which may lead to restricted use 
of the device.102  Thus, EU consumers are allowed to purchase and operate 
industrial wireless devices that are more likely to create interference.  
Accordingly, EU consumers assume the increased risk of purchasing non-
residential devices that may become impermissible to operate.  In addition, 
the EU regulatory approach does not preclude consumers from using 
commercial-grade devices when in a non-residential environment.103  
Thus, the EU approach recognizes a regulatory distinction between 
industrial devices and consumer devices but, unlike the United States, it 
does not impose marketing restrictions to preclude sales to consumers. 
 
B.  MANDATORY DEVICE LABELING AND CONSUMER NOTIFICATION 
 
[30]  The labeling and consumer notification requirements in the European 
Union and Canada illustrate two approaches: (a) mandatory labeling and 
consumer notification including required notification of general 
interference risks, and (b) mandatory device labeling for compliance with 
required notification of specific interference risks.  Pursuant to the first 
approach, the European Union uses mandatory labeling and consumer 
notification requirements similar to the FCC approach.104  Manufacturers 
                                                 
100 See generally Council Directive 2004/108, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 24 (EC) (regulating 
electromagnetic compatibility of equipment); Council Directive 93/68, 1993 O.J. (L 220) 
1 (EC) (describing the restriction or prohibition measures of device marketing where 
noncompliance continues). 
101 See Council Directive 2004/108, supra note 100, art. 4. 
102 See Council Directive 2004/108, supra note 100, art. 9(4) (“Apparatus for which 
compliance with the protection requirements is not ensured in residential areas shall be 
accompanied by a clear indication of this restriction of use, where appropriate also on the 
packaging.”). 
103 See Council Directive 2004/108, supra note 100, art. 4. 
104 See Council Directive 2004/108, supra note 100, art. 9 (requiring apparatus 
identification and instructions).  See generally EUROPEAN COMM’N, GUIDE TO THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVES BASED ON THE NEW APPROACH AND THE GLOBAL 
APPROACH 44-46 (2000), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newapproach/legislation/guide/document/1999_1282_en.pd
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are required to include text or a graphical mark on the device to indicate 
that the product complies with all applicable minimum performance 
requirements adopted by standardization bodies,105 as consistent with 
European Community directives.106  The European Community also 
requires consumer notification related to interference if the product may 
cause interference in a domestic environment and places the burden on the 
consumer to correct the interference.107  Thus, U.S. and EU consumers 
receive information, even if limited and generally post-sale, on device 
conformity with minimal performance standards and a general duty of the 
consumer to prevent and correct harmful interference.  
 
[31]  The second approach, illustrated by Canada’s regulatory approach, 
similarly requires manufacturers to test and label devices as compliant 
with technical performance standards.108  Canada, however, is increasingly 
requiring manufacturers to provide more detailed interference notification 
for certain types of devices.109  This notification requirement may be met 
solely through the inclusion of text in the owner’s manual.110  For 
example, a wireless local-area-network device operating in specific 
frequencies must provide a warning in the owner’s manual that the device 
may only be used indoors and that operating in specified frequency bands 
could cause interference or damage to the consumer’s device.111  This 
enhanced notification requirement signals a departure from Canada’s light 
regulatory approach to device compliance and consumer notification of 
                                                                                                                         
f (discussing labeling requirements, including the requirement that the mark on the device 
be at least 5 mm and indelible).  
105 See Council Directive 2004/108, supra note 100, arts. 8-9 (requiring that devices have 
the “CE” mark in text or in graphic form).   
106 See Council Directive 93/68, supra note 100, art. 2 (EU) (stating that devices must 
have a “CE” mark affixed to it); Council Directive 89/336, annex I, 1989 O.J. (L 139) 19 
(EU) (describing the “EC” conformity mark);  
107 See Council Directive 2004/108, supra note 100, art. 9(4). 
108 See Radiocommunication Regulations (Radiocommunication Act), SOR/96-484 
(Can.). 
109 See, e.g., Radio Standards Specifications RSS-210, Annex 9.5(7) (2007) (Can.) 
(requiring information about interference risks in specific frequency bands to be included 
in the user manual of local-area-networks). 
110 Cf. id.   
111 See id. Annex 9.3(2).  
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general interference risks.112  Previously, Canada boasted to consumers 
that 95% compliance rates could be achieved and interference problems 
severely limited through minimal regulatory intervention in product 
labeling and an as-needed approach to post-market enforcement.113  
Canadian regulators have asserted that a light regulatory approach, based 
on technical enforcement, decreases up front regulatory intervention, 
lowers costs, and streamlines device certification without unduly affecting 
consumer protections.114  Even with increased interference notification 
requirements for specific types of devices, Canada limits the labeling and 
consumer-notification obligations of manufacturers to the inclusion of 
such information in the owner’s manual or on the device.  
 
[32]  The European Union, the United States, and Canada are similar in 
that they impose no requirements on pre-sale information or external 
product packaging and thereby limit consumer access to decision-making 
information prior to or at the time of purchase.  Accordingly, consumers 
generally do not learn of the device’s compliance, operational limitations, 
or interference constraints until after they purchase the product.  Arguably, 
a compliance statement on the external packaging may not serve a 
valuable role if consumers expect all devices on the market to meet 
minimal technical standards. Information at the point of sale, however, 
may be beneficial in helping consumers to understand potential limitations 
on the operation of a device and to identify potential black-market 
devices.115  
 
C.  DUTY OF CONSUMER TO RESPOND TO HARMFUL INTERFERENCE 
COMPLAINTS 
 
[33]  Similar to the United States, both the European Union and Canada 
impose, either explicitly or implicitly, a duty on the consumer to prevent 
                                                 
112 See Radio Standards Specifications RSS-Gen, § 7.1.5 (2007) (Can.) (requiring 
notification in the user manual or on the device that the device may not cause and must 
accept any interference).  
113 See Claude Beaudoin, Indus. Can., Canadian Experience with Supplier’s Declaration 
of Conformity (SDoC) in the Telecommunications Sector: Presentation for the WTO 
TBT Committee Workshop on Suppliers’ Declaration of Conformity 11-13, 16 (Mar. 21, 
2005). 
114 See id. at 14-16.  
115 See infra Part IV, for a discussion of black market devices. 
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harmful interference.  The European Community explicitly notifies the 
consumer of the duty.  In comparison, Canada provides notification to the 
consumer of interference risks but fails to inform the consumer of 
recommended actions to correct interference.116  All three jurisdictions fail 
to inform the consumer of the consequences of continued operation of an 
interfering device.  
 
[34]  Similar to the FCC approach, the European Union requires 
manufacturers to certify wireless broadband devices as meeting minimal 
technical performance standards before being sold to consumers and then 
imposes a duty on consumers to protect against harmful interference.117  
Specifically, the consumer is warned that harmful interference may require 
the consumer “to take adequate measures” to abate the interference.118  
Similar to the vague U.S. legal standard, the EU standard does not specify 
what constitutes “harmful interference.”119  Further, the word “adequate” 
is not defined; this creates pragmatic and legal uncertainty for the 
consumer and enforcement.120  As a result, both the U.S. and the EU 
approaches lack clarity on thresholds of unacceptable interference levels 
for unlicensed devices used by the consumer.  Unlike the FCC rules and 
recommendations for self-correction of interference,121 the EU regulations 
do not require manufacturers to suggest steps a consumer might take to 
remedy interference.122  Significantly, neither the U.S. nor the EU 
regulatory regime requires manufacturers to provide explicit notification 
to the consumer of the consequences of inaction and continued operation 
of an interfering device.123  Thus, both the United States and the European 
Union first rely on product conformity with technical standards.  They 
then transfer the responsibility of noninterference to the consumer, 
including the duty to cease operation if the consumer is unable to correct 
the interference.   
                                                 
116 See infra notes 122-124. 
117 Council Directive 2004/108, supra note 100, arts. 3-5, annex I. 
118 See generally Council Directive 2004/108, supra note 100 (mentioning “harmful 
interference” but failing to include a definition in Article 2). 
119 See generally id. (showing that “adequate” is not included in the definition section of 
Article 2). 
120 See id.; 47 C.F.R. § 1.907 (2008) (defining the term “harmful interference”). 
121 See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. 
122 See Council Directive 2004/108, supra note 100. 
123 See Council Directive 2004/108, supra note 100; see also supra Part II.B. 
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[35]  Canadian consumers similarly have a duty under national regulations 
to cease operations if there is interference, even when the device is fully 
compliant.124  Despite the absence of notification with the product, 
consumers must take measures to correct interference caused by compliant 
devices.  When a consumer fails to mitigate the harmful interference in 
response to a complaint, a government inspector may conduct an 
investigation and determine what measures should be taken.125  Should a 
consumer fail to comply with the appropriate recommended measures, 
such as ceasing to use the device, the consumer will be subject to 
imprisonment and a financial penalty for each additional day of 
noncompliance and continued operation of an interfering device.126  Thus, 
the Canadian approach follows the U.S. and EU approach to interference 
prevention through device certification, but it does not impose a duty on 
manufacturers to inform consumers that they must take action to eliminate 
interference or of the consequences related to a failure to act in such 
instances. 
 
[36]  All three jurisdictions provide limited or no information to 
consumers at the point of sale to inform them of their duty to avoid 
harmful interference.  In spite of this, the countries impose such a duty on 
consumers and subject them to legal action if they do not uphold this 
duty.127  Even when consumers receive information about whose 
responsibility it is to resolve interference, they receive little, if any, 
information about what constitutes harmful interference, which 
circumstances require the cessation of device operation, and consequences 
of continued use.  Accordingly, there is a gap between what manufacturers 
have told consumers pursuant to regulatory requirements and what 
consumers are required to know about interference mitigation 
requirements, the potential risks associated with devices, and their right to 
operate such devices.  
 
                                                 
124 See Radiocommunication Regulations (Radiocommunication Act), SOR/96-484 
(Can.). 
125 See id. § 52(1).  
126 See Radiocommunication Act, R.S.C., ch. R-2, §§ 9-10 (1985) (Can.) (implementing 
either a fine that does not exceed five thousand dollars for an individual or imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding one year).  
127 See discussion Parts II.D, III.B-C. 
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D.  COST-SHIFTING TO CONSUMERS WHEN WIRELESS CONSUMER DEVICES 
CAUSE INTERFERENCE 
 
[37]  Similar to the United States, the European Union and Canada 
recognize pragmatic and contractual remedies for consumers when 
unlicensed wireless devices become unlawful to operate due to harmful 
interference, but these jurisdictions ultimately shift the costs to the 
consumer if those remedies are unsuccessful.128  The consumer’s remedies 
are largely dependent upon self-correction of interference, product return, 
product warranty, and resale (discussed in section II of this article).  
Although jurisdictions vary slightly in how they implement these 
remedies,129 consumers in all jurisdictions must absorb the financial loss 
when a device that is deemed compliant causes harmful interference.130  In 
such situations, the consumer must stop using the device.  Consequently, 
consumers in all three jurisdictions generally lack legal remedies for 
financial compensation when a compliant device becomes inoperable or 
unlawful to operate beyond the window for product return.131  
 
IV.  POTENTIAL INTERFERENCE THREATS TO CONSUMER DEVICES 
 
[38]  The rapidly evolving wireless landscape raises issues of spectrum 
coexistence policies to permit traditional and emergent technologies to 
proliferate in shared spectrum frequencies.  Inherent problems with 
addressing this issue include the difficulty of determining the 
compatibility and coexistence of technologies and increased risks of 
interference.  Interference risks arise from an increase in the number of 
unlicensed devices, a greater range of devices, and the proliferation of 
                                                 
128 Graham Longford, Presentation on Open Spectrum and Community Wireless 
Networking in Canada: a Preliminary Review of the Policy and Regulatory Landscape 6-
7 (Jan. 11, 2007), available at http://www.cwirp.ca/publications.php) (discussing the lack 
of protections for Canadian consumers when harmful interference occurs); see also 
Jennifer S. Martin, An Emerging Worldwide Standard for Protections of Consumers in 
the Sale of Goods: Did We Miss an Opportunity with Revised UCC Article 2?, 41 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 223, 240-42, 255-56 (2006) (discussing EU and Canadian contract law). 
129 See Martin, supra note 128, at 240-42, 255-56 (contrasting EU and Canadian contract 
law).  
130 Id.  
131 See id.; U.C.C. § 2-719 (1998). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XV, Issue 2 
 
 25
mobile wireless devices.132  This section discusses emergent interference 
threats posed by different technologies operating at the same location and 
black-market devices and how these interference threats impact consumer 
protections. 
 
A.  DIFFERENT WIRELESS BROADBAND TECHNOLOGIES OPERATING IN ONE 
LOCATION 
 
[39]  Multiple wireless infrastructure technologies and the growing variety 
of devices operating in one location are increasing the potential for 
interference across devices and technologies.133  Interference concerns are 
exacerbated in high-density urban and residential environments where the 
likelihood of the number of devices operating within a given area 
increases and the distance between devices decreases.134  The vast quantity 
and different types of interference sources have raised concerns about 
adequate prevention of harmful interference before technologies become 
widespread in the marketplace,135 effective enforcement to protect 
                                                 
132 See Robert Lemos, Got Interference? Data-Crowding Problems Loom for Wi-Fi, 
WIRED, July 17, 2007, available at 
http://www.wired.com/gadgets/wireless/news/2007/07/wifi_interference (discussing 
increasing sources of interference from overlapping municipal, neighborhood, residential 
wireless networks, and the myriad of residential electronics); Paul G. Schreier, Spectrum 
Analyzers Respond to Digital Modulation, TEST & MEASUREMENT WORLD, June 2007, at 
45, available at http://www.tmworld.com/contents/pdf/6447664.pdf (identifying a trend 
towards greater interference among wireless consumer devices across wider frequency 
ranges and from a dramatic increase in signal sources).  
133 See Raul Etkin, Abhay Parekh & David Tse, Spectrum Sharing for Unlicensed Bands, 
25 IEEE J. ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMS. 517, 517 (2007), available at 
http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/~nikhils/gtpres/repeatedgame-spectrumsharing.pdf 
(concluding that interference may cause unfair and inefficient outcomes for consumers as 
determined by a hypothetical urban scenario of multiple wireless systems operating in the 
same band); Gadi Singer, Chief Tech. Officer, Intel Corp., Abstract, Presentation on 
Communication Infrastructure from Vision to Reality (Oct. 25, 2004) (asserting that no 
single technology – 3G, UWB, Wi-Fi and WiMax – will become dominant and thus a 
combination of technologies must coexist). 
134 See Lemos, supra note 132 (discussing interference in high-density environments with 
overlapping wireless infrastructures).  
135 See Joint Reply Comments of the Ass’n for Maximum Serv. Television, Inc. and the 
Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters at iii, In re Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands, 
Additional Spectrum for Unlicensed Devices Below 900 MHz and in the 3 GHz Band, 
ET Docket Nos. 04-186, 02-380 (Mar. 2, 2007) [hereinafter MSTV & NAB Joint Reply 
Comments] (concluding that laboratory device testing inadequately addresses 
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licensees when harmful interference occurs,136 and spectrum 
congestion.137  These issues can directly impact consumers because they 
threaten to degrade the performance of wireless broadband devices and 
may require consumers to stop using devices.  These issues also suggest a 
possible increase in the number of consumer disputes, which currently 
lack adequate dispute-resolution mechanisms.138  Thus, greater numbers of 
wireless broadband technologies operating at the same location may result 
in more consumers being burdened with devices that require updates or 
require that consumers replace such devices with non-interfering devices.  
Such changes are likely to be at the consumer’s expense and may be more 
frequent due to rapidly changing technologies. 
 
B.  BLACK-MARKET DEVICES: UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE 
 
[40]  The major difficulties with increased market penetration of black-
market devices arise from two dependent factors: detection and 
                                                                                                                         
marketplace conditions and that the FCC should not allow unlicensed devices in licensed 
spectrum due to unacceptable interference risks to commercial services); see also Reply 
Comments of MSTV and NAB to the OET Report on the Performance of Prototype TV-
Band White Space Devices at 6-8, In re Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast 
Bands, Additional Spectrum for Unlicensed Devices Below 900 MHz and in the 3 GHz 
Band, ET Docket Nos. 04-186, 02-380 (Aug. 27, 2007) (stating that unlicensed 
personal/portable devices ineffectively prevent harmful interference to the television 
spectrum).  But see IEEE-USA Board of Directors, Improving Spectrum Usage Through 
Cognitive Radio Technology (Nov. 13, 2003), 
http://www.ieeeusa.org/policy/positions/cognitiveradio.asp (asserting that innovative 
technologies can facilitate temporal and geographical sharing of spectrum in the future).  
136 See MSTV & NAB Joint Reply Comments, supra note 135, at 7-18 (recommending 
that the FCC implement protections should unlicensed consumer devices be allowed to 
operate in licensed broadcast spectrum); MSTV Lobbies Against Unlicensed Devices, 
BROADCAST ENGINEERING, Dec. 18, 2006, available at 
http://broadcastengineering.com/RF/mstv-against-unlicensed-devices1218/ (spotlighting 
MSTV’s concerns with FCC enforcement should a product become widespread and with 
the lengthy process for product recalls).    
137 Lemos, supra note 132 (discussing how consumers may find too many users operating 
within the same location and thus experience degraded device performance and Internet 
connectivity).  
138 See Philip J. Weiser & Dale N. Hatfield, Policing the Spectrum Commons, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 663, 684-86 (2005) (discussing how increasingly rival unlicensed 
spectrum users are looking for dispute mechanisms).  
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XV, Issue 2 
 
 27
enforcement.139  First, the black-market device must be detected and 
identified by the consumer at or before the point of sale or when a 
consumer device is subject to interference from an unlawful black-market 
device.140  At the point of sale, a U.S. consumer’s attempt to identify a 
black-market device is frustrated by the lack of mandatory requirements 
for external product packaging.141  After purchase, the consumer will 
likely find that black-market devices do not abide by labeling and 
consumer notification requirements, or technical standards for power 
limits and frequency emissions.142  As such, the lack of mandatory 
external product packaging requirements may frustrate the consumer’s 
initial decision to purchase only lawful devices and may result in a 
consumer unknowingly purchasing and operating an unlawful device that 
causes harmful interference. 
 
[41]  Although a consumer operating a compliant wireless device must 
accept most interference, the consumer still has legal rights against 
interference caused by unlawful black-market devices.143  The consumer, 
however, is unlikely to possess the knowledge or sophisticated equipment 
required to detect and confirm that the interference is caused by an 
unlawful black-market device.  Accordingly, the ability to detect and 
identify interference from a black-market device is limited by consumer 
awareness, technical ability to identify unlawful devices, and dependency 
on other market actors (including regulators) for black-market prevention, 
detection, and enforcement. 
                                                 
139 See Press Release, Indus. Can., Buyer Beware: Industry Canada Cautions Canadians 
Against Buying Illegal Satellite Systems (Dec. 17, 2002) (on file with author), available 
at http://www.ic.gc.ca/epic/site/ic1.nsf/en/02624e.html (warning consumers of unlawful 
black-market direct-to-home satellite devices, providing a checklist for consumers when 
purchasing these devices, and informing the consumers of legal consequences of 
unlawful device operation and risks of “useless” equipment). 
140 See id.  
141 See 47 C.F.R. § 15.19 (2008) (requiring labels for compliant devices on the item itself, 
and, for devices too small for the label, allowing the manufacturer to choose whether to 
place the label in the device manual or on external packaging).   
142 Press Release, Indus. Can., supra note 139. 
143 See 47 C.F.R. § 15.5 (stating that a FCC representative can require a device no longer 
be used if it is causing harmful interference). 
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V.  CONSUMER PROTECTION MECHANISMS 
 
[42]  Thus far, the FCC’s light regulatory approach to evolving wireless 
technologies has fostered the proliferation of low-cost, unlicensed wireless 
devices and achieved social and public policy goals to increase consumer 
choice and a robust marketplace.144  In its consideration of how to make 
more broadband services available to consumers, the Task Force 
recommended continuing this trend through voluntary cooperation across 
industry actors and consumers using unlicensed wireless devices.145  It is 
unclear, however, whether a solely voluntary approach to spectrum 
coordination and interference management will adequately protect 
consumers’ interests, particularly in light of emergent interference 
concerns, weak enforcement mechanisms, and cost-shifting to the 
consumer when devices become unlawful to operate.  Thus, this section 
examines the advantages, disadvantages, and limitations of possible 
marketplace, regulatory, and legal reforms designed to enhance 
protections for U.S. consumers operating unlicensed wireless broadband 
devices in licensed and unlicensed spectrum.  
 
A.  MARKETPLACE SOLUTIONS: VOLUNTARY COOPERATION AND 
CONSUMER EDUCATION 
 
[43]  Key industry associations and technology proponents support the 
Task Force’s recommended laissez-faire approach to the effective 
management of interference issues.  A voluntary approach allows 
manufacturers, industry stakeholders, and consumers to choose which 
                                                 
144 See Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 25, 30 (2002) (referring to the rapid growth of consumer equipment and how this 
enables low-cost solutions of social benefit through open networks); see also OFFICE OF 
COMMC’NS, DIGITAL DIVIDEND REVIEW: A STATEMENT ON OUR APPROACH TO 
AWARDING THE DIGITAL DIVIDEND 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/ddr/statement/statement.pdf (“Wireless 
services are now widely available at low cost, to the benefit of both individuals and 
society as a whole.”); Press Release, Commc’ns Research Ctr. Can., CRC Highlights 
2006-2007: Building Next Generation Communications Technologies for Canada, 
available at 
http://www.crc.ca/en/html/crc/home/info_crc/publications/highlights_0607/highlights_06
07 (highlighting that wireless standards foster low-cost wireless equipment and will 
enable broadband access in rural areas of Canada in 2009). 
145 See WIRELESS BROADBAND ACCESS TASK FORCE, supra note 7, at 5-6.  
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technologies and services will dominate, thus promoting market-based 
technical innovation.146  Specifically, the groups advocate for the use of 
private self-certification efforts by manufacturers, private dispute-
resolution mechanisms, technical solutions, and preventative consumer 
education.147  As an example of the self-certification approach, the Wi-Fi 
Alliance asserts that its private testing program protects the interests of 
“both the consumer and the industry.”148  The Wi-Fi Alliance allows 
participating manufacturers to include the Wi-Fi Alliance-certified logo on 
product packaging to help consumers identify reliable products.149  The 
Wi-Fi Alliance website does not indicate whether the Wi-Fi Alliance has 
ever initiated an enforcement action nor does it specify whether 
information about enforcement against manufacturers would be made 
public.150  The Wi-Fi Alliance serves as an example of how industry self-
certification programs can create market benefits through decreased 
regulatory costs, potentially lower device costs for consumers, and 
improved product branding to help guide consumer choices.  In the 
absence of effective dispute-resolution mechanisms and transparency of 
enforcement actions, however, consumer benefits remain limited. 
 
[44]  With respect to market-based technical solutions, technology 
advocates have proposed various technologies and methods that allow 
devices to dynamically share permissible frequencies or to operate within 
limited geographical areas.151  Organizations, such as the National 
                                                 
146 See generally Comments of the Wireless Commc’ns Ass’n Int’l, Inc., In re 
Modification of Parts 2 and 15 of the Commission’s Rules for Unlicensed Devices and 
Equipment Approval, ET Docket No. 03-201 (Oct. 15, 2007), available at 
http://wcai.com/images/pdf/fcc_oct15.pdf. 
147 Id. at 2 (“WCA continues to support voluntary frequency coordination and other ‘best 
practices’ among unlicensed users, approaches that do not undermine the flexibility and 
technological innovation that has been critical to the success of unlicensed services over 
the past decade.”). 
148 See Jeffrey Silva, M2M Companies Ask for Spectrum Etiquette as More Unlicensed 
Devices Come to Market, RCR WIRELESS NEWS, Oct. 26, 2007, available at 
http://www.rcrwireless.com/article/20071026/SUB/71026017/M2M-companies-ask-for-
spectrum-etiquette-as-more-unlicensed-devices-come-to-market. 
149 See Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 138, at 678-79 (noting the Wi-Fi Alliance is worth 
considering but recognizing that it is still too early to assess its effectiveness at 
enforcement).  
150 See Wi-Fi Alliance Website, http://www.wi-fi.org (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).   
151 See Comments of the Nat’l Telecommunications and Info. Admin. at 39-43, In re 
Facilitating Opportunities for Flexible, Efficient, and Reliable Spectrum Use Employing 
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Telecommunications and Information Administration, assert that lower 
regulatory burdens promote new market entrants, responsiveness to 
technological changes, and consumer benefits by enhancing product 
choices.152  The emerging technologies, however, are criticized as 
unproven,153 questionably effective,154 difficult to certify for 
noninterference,155 and easy to alter.156  These technologies are also 
burdened by internalized bargaining costs as consumers work out 
acceptable congestion levels for those operating unlicensed devices.157  
Further, these technologies may render equipment more costly due to 
increased complexity in software programming and product 
development.158 
 
[45]  Consumer education has also been seen as a valuable market-based 
activity to promote best practices by industry and consumers to minimize 
interference in residential environments.159  David Case, a senior 
regulatory engineer for Cisco Systems Inc., believes that because “the 
consumer ultimately ends up with the problem. . . . [t]he only solution at 
this time is better consumer education.”160  He asserts that because retail 
                                                                                                                         
Cognitive Radio Technologies, ET Docket No. 03-108 (Feb. 15, 2005) (describing 
compliance measurements for interruptible radio, listen-before-talk, and geolocation 
technologies). 
152 Id. at viii. 
153 See id. at 18 (discussing the lack of maturity of the sensing and geolocation techniques 
supported by software-defined radio and cognitive radio technologies).  
154 See OFFICE OF COMMUC’NS, TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH PROGRAMME: RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT AT OFCOM 2005/06, at 13 (2006) (highlighting that CR technologies may 
be unable to detect “hidden” primary users due to receive-only devices or unfavorable 
“propagation” conditions).   
155 See Raul Etkin, Abhay Parekh & David Tse, supra note 133, at 517. 
156 See id. 
157 See Thomas W. Hazlett & Matthew L. Spitzer, Advanced Wireless Technologies and 
Public Policy, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 595, 664 (2006) (examining the regulatory proposal to 
impose new unlicensed spectrum allocations, rejecting the “commons” unlicensed 
spectrum approach, and asserting beneficial outcomes where unlicensed devices do not 
extensively share spectrum in complex ways).  
158 But see id. at 656-57.  
159 See Denis Kuwahara, Boeing Co., Comments to IC UWB Consultation on IEEE 
P802.18 Radio Regulatory – TAG (Apr. 2005) (“Consumer education on the use of 
license-exempt devices could do much to eliminate interference.”). 
160 David A. Case, Residential Spectrum Management: The Manufacturer’s Role, 
COMPLIANCE ENGINEERING, http://www.ce-mag.com/archive/05/01/014.html (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2008). 
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salespeople generally lack sufficient product knowledge to adequately 
inform consumers, manufacturers should provide “specific” warnings 
inside product packaging which describe interference risks, spectrum 
compatibility with competitors’ products, and other devices designed to 
operate in the same spectrum.161  Case’s solution, however, is based on 
post-sale information provided to consumers.  His solution relies on the 
presumption that consumers will return a product after receiving such 
information.162  Even if the information is provided during the sales cycle, 
the all-voluntary approach remains prone to lackluster participation 
because companies lack incentives to promote another company’s devices 
rather than their own.163  The voluntary approach could also lead to 
consumers receiving inconsistent information about a device’s 
compatibility with other spectrum-dependent devices.164  Further, the 
voluntary warnings may increase manufacturer costs and product prices.165 
 
[46]  One solution is for consumer protection groups and the media to 
educate and inform consumers.166  Such efforts are limited because they 
indirectly impact consumers, whereas manufacturers and retailers directly 
enhance consumer awareness by providing information in product 
                                                 
161 Id.  
162 See id. 
163 Cf. ELISE GOLAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECONOMICS OF FOOD LABELING 8 
(2001) (discussing the limitations to market incentives for voluntary labeling programs, 
such as where the labeling by one manufacturer could result in benefits to rivals); Nicole 
Darnall, Addressing Global Environmental Challenges: Using Information as a Novel 
“Local” Policy Approach, 4 GLOBAL STUD. REV. 1, 2 (2008) (asserting that most 
companies would not participate in voluntary-labeling programs for environmental 
products). 
164 Cf. Darnall, supra note 163, at 2 (concluding that voluntary programs “would not be 
useful at providing consumers consistent information to inform their purchasing 
decisions”). 
165 Cf. Letter from Gregory Jaffe, Co-Director, Biotechnology Project, Center for Science 
in the Public Interest, to Dockets Management Branch (HFA-305), Food and Drug 
Administration (May 16, 2001), available at 
http://www.cspinet.org/biotech/cspi_gepoll.html (stating that consumers are unwilling to 
pay higher prices for food labeling).  
166 See, e.g., Digital Television Transition (DTV), http://www.dtvtransition.org/ (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2008) (describing a public-private coalition to educate consumers about 
the digital television switchover in the United States in 2009). 
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enclosures.167  Voluntary consumer education could provide consumers 
additional beneficial information, but market forces alone would be 
unlikely to produce optimal consumer education required for effective 
interference management.  Lastly, voluntary activities neither confer 
greater legal protections to consumers when the equipment becomes 
inoperable, nor provide greater enforcement mechanisms to ensure the 
legal rights associated with licensed services and devices.  Thus, an all-
voluntary approach to protecting the economic interests of licensees and 
the property rights of consumers in their devices may yield inefficient and 
unfair outcomes.168  
 
B.  REGULATORY SOLUTIONS: RULES, OUTREACH, AND EFFECTIVE 
ENFORCEMENT 
 
[47]  A second solution is to improve and enhance the FCC’s regulatory 
activities to protect consumers by providing better labeling and 
notification requirements, educational programs, increased clarity in 
interference standards, and enhanced regulatory oversight of compliance 
and enforcement.169  First, the FCC could amend its labeling and 
notification requirements to require notice before or at the point of sale.170  
This additional requirement could augment, rather than replace, the 
existing requirements to provide notification inside the packaging or 
through electronic notification. 
 
[48]  Second, to limit the imposition on manufacturing companies and 
dealers to provide plain English rules relevant to consumers, the FCC 
could conduct a consumer education campaign to communicate the 
                                                 
167 See 47 C.F.R. § 15.117(k) (2008) (requiring sellers of analog televisions without 
digital tuners to provide a conspicuous “Consumer Warning Alert” on the equipment at 
the point of sale).    
168 See Raul Etkin, Abhay Parek & David Tse, supra note 133, at 517 (pointing to 
mathematical modeling of transmitters and receivers in a fixed system to ascertain that 
the asymmetries and selfish behavior in a voluntary system of spectrum noninterference 
management contribute to inefficient solutions). 
169 Cf. GOLAN ET AL., supra note 163, at 13-18 (discussing the reasons, costs, and benefits 
of mandatory labeling as a policy tool). 
170 See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 15.117(k) (requiring a conspicuous “Consumer Alert” to be 
placed on the screen or on top of analog televisions that lack digital tuners, prior to sale). 
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advantages and limitations of unlicensed devices.171  The campaign could 
help consumers understand which factors are significant before choosing 
an unlicensed device.172  Third, the FCC could clarify technical standards 
for interference (such as according to each type of device) and elaborate 
on the legal definition of harmful interference for consumer-operated 
devices. 173  The current vague standard offers flexibility but also leads to 
unexpected surprises for consumers.  As equipment prices of unlicensed 
devices increase, cost-shifting to the consumer and a dearth of remedies 
deprive the consumer of adequate market protections.  Given that 
manufacturers and retailers seek to sell more devices, they have an 
incentive to shorten market cycles for equipment replacement and may be 
driven by motives contrary to consumer financial interests.  As a result, 
the FCC should reevaluate the impact of equipment price increases and the 
resultant cost-shifting to consumers. 
 
[49]  The FCC should continue to take a cautious approach to device 
certification, requiring all new devices to comply with noninterference.174  
Noninterference testing is particularly important when the device is 
intended to operate in shared licensed spectrum,175 or where there is a 
potential for interference with existing spectrum uses, such as medical and 
astronomy services.176  Lastly, the FCC could provide enhanced complaint 
processing and dispute resolution mechanisms.177  
                                                 
171 See, e.g., Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, The Digital TV Transition: What You Need to 
Know About DTV, http://www.dtv.gov/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2008) (providing 
educational information about the advantages of the digital television transition and about 
the DTV equipment available to consumers). 
172 See, e.g., FCC Consumer Advisory, Buying the Right TV: What Every Consumer 
Should Know (Jan. 3, 2008), http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/dtvlabels.html. 
173 See Margie, supra note 55, at ¶¶ 16-29.  
174 See generally 47 C.F.R. § 15 (requiring unlicensed devices to comply with rules and 
regulations regarding noninterference). 
175 See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, The FCC’s Office of Engineering 
and Technology Announces the Initiation of Field Testing for Prototype TV White Space 
Devices: ET Docket No. 04-186 (July 10, 2008), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-08-1635A1.doc.  
176 See, e.g., Letter from Richard Whitt, Washington Telecom & Media Counsel, Google, 
to Marlene H. Dortch, Office of the Sec’y, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n 3 (Mar. 21, 2008) 
(proposing a “safe harbor” of spectrum to protect, in part, medical and astronomy devices 
and services from interference by unlicensed broadband devices). 
177 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, supra note 87, at 34-36 
(recommending improvement for new processes and accountability of FCC’s 
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[50]  The disadvantages of a greater regulatory role are three-fold.  First, 
increased administrative oversight will increase regulatory costs and may 
result in higher consumer costs.178  Second, it remains uncertain how to 
better certify devices given increasingly complicated hardware and 
software device components, and how such re-certification would occur 
when newer replacement technologies enter the marketplace.179  Third, 
even licensee incumbents may find a lack of efficient and productive 
enforcement mechanisms against consumers using interfering devices 
after the devices enter the marketplace.180  In such cases, market forces 
may provide a better remedy by creating consumer incentives to purchase 
replacement equipment.   
 
C.  CONSUMER PROTECTION LEGISLATION: THE LAST RESORT 
 
[51]  The third option is to improve consumer protection laws and 
contractual mechanisms to provide a right of product return.  As discussed 
above, at present, consumers with an interfering device have limited legal 
options after the window of time for product returns has passed.  
Generally, this is not an issue for lower-cost items.  Consumers 
historically have replaced technologies on a voluntary, cost-benefit basis, 
exchanging older products for newer devices.181  As expensive unlicensed 
devices permeate the marketplace, however, the cost-benefit basis 
disfavors consumers.  Thus, mechanisms may be needed to mitigate 
consumer costs when equipment becomes unusable or interference causes 
the performance to degrade. 
 
                                                                                                                         
enforcement program due to insufficient resolution of consumer complaints and rarity of 
enforcement actions). 
178 See GOLAN ET AL., supra note 163, at 16. 
179 See Louis E. Frenzel, Complex Wireless Standards Put Instruments to the Test, 
ELECTRONIC DESIGN, June 18, 2008, 
http://electronicdesign.com/Articles/ArticleID/19010/19010.html (discussing how 
increasingly advanced technologies are complicating the testing for regulatory 
compliance and interoperability requirements).  
180 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, supra note 87, at 3, 14 (finding 
that FCC enforcement actions are rare). 
181 See David S. Joachim, The Word on Warranties: Don’t Bother, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 
2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/01/technology/circuits/01warr.html 
(discussing how consumers groups advise consumers not to purchase warranties because 
prices for replacement electronics keep falling). 
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[52]  The disadvantage of increasing consumer protections is that it 
confers greater rights to the consumers and could be abused to allow 
consumers a right of return for any reason, rather than meeting its purpose 
of mitigating inoperable or interfering equipment.  This could cause cost-
shifting to manufacturers and retailers, which could significantly deter 
major technology investments and new product designs.182  Further, the 
legislative approach may not adequately respond to technological 
innovation.183  New legislation may also impinge on existing licensees’ 
rights and consumers who pay for wireless services.  Moreover, the 
legislative approach may foster litigation rather than innovation.  Lastly, it 
could further impede investment and confidence in emergent technologies.  
Thus, increased consumer legislation should be reserved for use only after 
other mechanisms are proven to be ineffective at adequately protecting 
consumers.  
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
[53]  Historically, consumers have benefited from innovative uses of 
spectrum and arguably will continue to benefit from increased 
technological solutions and a light regulatory approach to unlicensed  
consumer devices.  Thus far, the impacts to consumers from harmful 
interference and inoperable devices have been mitigated by: 1) 
interference prevention through FCC-mandated technical standards; 2) 
compliance testing; and 3) voluntary consumer action, including efforts to 
correct interference and gradual equipment replacement as technologies 
evolve to offer more features and capabilities.  Emergent wireless 
broadband technologies for consumer devices, however, increasingly 
challenge traditional notions of spectrum management, when and how 
consumers use unlicensed devices, and the cost of those devices.  
 
                                                 
182 Cf. Doug Johnson, Will Legislation Improve Energy Efficiency in Consumer 
Products?, ELECTRONICS WKLY., Mar. 12, 2008, available at 
http://www.electronicsweekly.com/Articles/2008/03/12/43315/will-legislation-improve-
energy-efficiency-in-consumer-products.htm (asserting that a government mandate to 
require energy compliance by consumer electronics would “stifle innovation, limit 
consumer choice, and interfere with competitive trends”). 
183 See PETER H. SCHUCK, THE LIMITS OF LAW: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 
450 (2000) (stating that dynamic policy environments, such as computer technology, 
require responsive adjustments to avoid market distortions or unnecessary barriers). 
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[54]  Even though the FCC has now authorized additional spectrum access 
for wireless broadband devices, multiple market actors continue to lobby 
the FCC for their competing positions.  Incumbent licensees, such as 
commercial broadcasters and cellular providers, are urging the FCC to 
reconsider its position on shared spectrum access and to protect the 
financial interests of licensees and consumers of commercial services.184  
Technology and equipment companies, such as Google, Microsoft, and 
Motorola, continue to promote the consumer benefits of technological 
advances, such as increased innovation and equipment choices.185  These 
companies also have an implicit motivation to increase online advertising, 
fee-based services, and device sales.  Consumer advocates have largely 
supported the positions of equipment manufacturers and technology 
companies because of overall consumer benefits.186  Consumer 
advocates, however, have remained silent on implications for consumers 
should emergent, unlicensed, wireless broadband devices be deactivated, 
recalled, or declared unlawful to operate after purchase.  
 
[55]  The FCC’s plan to rely on enhanced certification standards for 
wireless broadband devices will play a crucial role in promoting 
innovation and marketplace competition, while building confidence in 
consumers and other market actors through interference prevention.  
Focusing on interference prevention, however, does not address consumer 
rights, duties, and remedies should interference occur.  Given that 
regulatory experimentation is intended to benefit consumers, the FCC 
should consider the adequacy of remedies for consumers when devices 
cause or suffer from harmful interference, particularly if devices become 
more costly for consumers to replace with non-interfering technologies.   
                                                 
184 See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, NAB Statement on Today’s FCC 
Ruling on ‘White Spaces’ (Nov. 4, 2008), available at 
http://www.nab.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Press_Releases1&CONTENTID=13447
&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm; Joint Comments in Support of “Emergency 
Request,” supra note 19, at 1-6. 
185 See, e.g., Olga Kharif, FCC Opens New Airwaves to the Public, BUS. WK., Nov. 5, 
2008, 
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov2008/tc2008115_197440.htm 
(“Some within the industry see white-space gear and services taking off as quickly as Wi-
Fi, which debuted in 2000.”). 
186 See, e.g., Press Release, Pub. Knowledge, Public Interest Organizations Commend 
FCC for Boosting Wireless Internet (Nov. 4, 2008), available at 
http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/1850.  
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[56]  The FCC could also play a role in ensuring consumers understand 
the implications of interference enforcement for newer products prior to or 
at the point of purchase.  This objective could be accomplished through 
consumer education campaigns and enhanced information on external 
product packaging.  Further, the FCC could promote more effective public 
and private complaint and dispute-resolution mechanisms. 
 
[57]  Consumer advocacy groups should lobby the FCC for greater 
inclusion of consumer protections in policy discussions.  Increased 
advocacy and consumer representation will help ensure adequate 
consideration of consumer interests as distinct from other market actors.  
Representation of consumer interests is particularly important with respect 
to burden-shifting to consumers to resolve harmful interference, technical 
proposals to disable or deactivate interfering equipment remotely without 
the consumer’s consent or prior notification, privacy safeguards, and 
enhanced enforcement and dispute mechanisms. 
 
